Special edition – Brazil’s Democratic “Backsliding”: It is worse than imagined
by Beatriz Silva da Costa*
Reviewed and edited by Anna Paula Bennech and Giovanna Imbernon
Organized by Flavia Batista da Silva
The current worldwide democracy crisis is not unexpected. In 2020, the Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report was published concerning news for democratic regimes (Centre for the Future of Democracy, 2020). Covering over 154 countries, Brazil included, it was the first time throughout the past 25 years that the world has spoken how unsatisfied it is with democracy. Since 1990, the share of individuals who are “dissatisfied” with democracy has risen by 10% points, from 47.9% to 57.5%. This raise represents the highest level of democratic discontent. Why are citizens so discontent with democracy? Why is Brazil at its highest-ever recorded level for democratic dissatisfaction? Researchers found out that citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to: say that the national economy is bad; state that they cannot improve their standard of living in the country; believe that their free expression is not protected. In addition, citizens see their political representatives as uncaring, out of touch, and corrupt (Pew Research Center, 2019). Perhaps, these factors can partially resemble the victory of Jair Bolsonaro (no-party) in the 2018 Brazilian presidential election.
It is important to remember that Brazil is a new democracy: it is only 33 years old. The transition from a dictatorship regime to a democratic one has not been easy. In 2018, on the 30th birthday of our brand-new democracy, only 34% of the Brazilian population was supportive of democracy (Latinobarómetro, 2018). The political polarization in the country deepened with Bolsonaro’s conservative campaign. A part of society protested felt nostalgic for military dictatorship (Vox, 2017). Research shows this feeling is experienced in many other countries facing a bad economic context, high levels of crime and inequality, and corruption (Przeworski, 2019). The country was in turmoil against any political figures with ties to the Workers’ Party (PT in Portuguese). PT’s corruption record was one of the main campaign mottos that Bolsonaro used to obtain as many votes as possible. And he did it well. With a political campaign inflamed by fake news, hate speech, and anti-corruption discourses, Bolsonaro presented himself as a savior for Brazil. Unfortunately, the voters believed in the Mito[1].
On the first electoral turn, Bolsonaro disputed the election with 12 candidates. His main rival candidates were Fernando Haddad (PT) and Ciro Gomes (PDT). As left-wing options, they split the votes of those who did not vote on Bolsonaro (PSL back then). After Bolsonaro (46.03%), Fernando Haddad was the second candidate with more votes (29.28%). Between the first and second turns, Brazil was set on fire. Bolsonaro instigated distrust of the electoral process by stating that, according to the polls, he should have been elected in the first turn. This statement was proven wrong since pools at the time indicated a runoff between him and Haddad. As soon as the first allegations of electoral fraud appeared, the country was flooded with protests. Bolsonaro’s supporters held violent protests across the country. Some of them even burned a replica of a ballot box and demanded the elections’ revocation (Veja, 2021). In the opposite direction, the Ele Não protests asked the Brazilian society to defeat Bolsonaro’s undemocratic behavior on the second turn (BBC, 2018). For one minute of hope, the results seemed to have changed. However, with a 10.26% difference, Bolsonaro defeated Haddad in the election. On October 29th, 2018, the Brazilian democracy elected a former army captain as its 38th president.
The 2018 election pathed the way to democratic backsliding in Brazil. Different from the past democratic erosion by a military coup in 1964, the current moment indicates that Bolsonaro’s government is a threat to Brazilian democracy (The Economist, 2021). By electing a far-right populist, Brazil has opened the gate to authoritarianism. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) elaborated a test to identify any authoritarian politician. In a speech given in Sao Paulo in 2018, Levitsky affirmed that Bolsonaro checks for all the four warning signs of authoritarianism (Harvard International Review, 2019). Here comes the first: Bolsonaro rejects democratic rules. On several occasions, he exalted Brazil’s 1964 military coup and denied that the dictatorship nature of Brazil’s 1964-1985 regime (Folha, 2019). For example, during the impeachment of former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff (PT), who was arrested and tortured during the 1964-1985 dictatorship in Brazil, Bolsonaro (then a Congressman) exalted Carlos Ustra, one of Dilma’s torturers (BBC, 2016).
The second sign is also present in Bolsonaro: he denies the legitimacy of opponents. Bolsonaro affirmed that he would only lose the 2018 election if there were fraud, inflaming the voters to question the electoral system. The third warning sign is the encouragement of violence – one of Bolsonaro’s main characteristics. The fourth warning sign of authoritarianism is the willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents. On Bolsonaro’s presidential inauguration day, he stated that the Brazilian flag would never be red (color related to communism) (Extra Globo, 2019).
Since he took office in 2019, Bolsonaro has tried to control the Brazilian political institutions. There are many examples to name, but this was a milestone in Bolsonaro’s government: in 2020, former Minister of Justice, Sérgio Moro (who was also one of the leading judges in the Car Wash Operation[2]) leaked a presidential meeting recording with serious accusations that Bolsonaro tried to intervene in operations held by the Federal Police (BBC, 2021). In this case, the investigations were about the alleged criminal conduct of his sons. Bolsonaro denies such accusations, even though he changed three times the appointee for the Federal Police – including a family friend, whose nomination was barred by the Superior Federal Court. In his own cabinet, Bolsonaro does not admit ministers who are not aligned with his ideas. Another problematic statement came from one of Bolsonaro’s ex-ministers, Abraham Weintraub, who said that he would arrest the ministers of the Superior Court.
Additionally, Bolsonaro told his ministers that he had the power and he would interfere in all cabinet ministries, with no exception. Indeed, he kept his word. Since then, any ministers that have publicly positioned themselves against Bolsonaro have left the government. For Przeworski (2019), any government that has this agenda of democratic erosion “concentrates on disabling potential blockers, which differ from case to case but typically include the opposition parties, the judicial system, and the media, as well as the streets” (p.173).
This scenario has forced us to question: “Are the Brazilian political institutions strong enough to contain Bolsonaro’s threat?”. I do not know the answer, but I can tell you that our institutions are trying and struggling to succeed. As of the time of this article, 1,507 people and more than 500 organizations signed President Jair Bolsonaro’s impeachment orders. So far, only 6 orders have been filed or disregarded. The other 115 are waiting for appreciation. A Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI in Portuguese) was installed, and it is investigating whether the Federal Government encouraged the intentional contagion of the COVID-19 virus in the country. The CPI’s latest investigation is now about the possible irregularities in a Health Ministry contract to purchase 20 million doses of the Indian vaccine Covaxin. The next steps of this CPI can involve a breach of fiscal, telephone, and bank secrecy of the investigated suspects of overpricing in the purchase of the Indian vaccine. During the last months, thousands of Brazilians protested on the streets begging for his impeachment. Unfortunately, more than 500,000 people had to die for our political institutions to start realizing that Bolsonaro’s rule is a worse threat than coronavirus. Hopefully, it is not too late.
[1] Bolsonaro’s nickname during the campaign. Translated as the “Myth”.
[2] Lava Jato in Portuguese.
References
BBC. 2016. “’Enquanto me dava choques, Ustra me batia com cipó e gritava’, diz torturado aos 19 anos”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2016/04/160419_torturado_ustra_bolsonaro_lgb.
BBC. 2018. “Jair Bolsonaro: Large protests against Brazil election front-runner”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45696677.
BBC. 2021. “Interferência na PF, pandemia, ‘passar a boiada’: o que fez governo Bolsonaro em um ano desde reunião ministerial”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-56821979.
Centre for the Future of Democracy. 2020. “The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/DemocracyReport2020.pdf.
Extra Globo. 2019. “’Bandeira jamais será vermelha’, diz Bolsonaro em discurso no Palácio do Planalto”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://extra.globo.com/noticias/brasil/bandeira-jamais-sera-vermelha-diz-bolsonaro-em-discurso-no-palacio-do-planalto-23339528.html.
Folha. 2019. “Bolsonaro nega ditadura e diz que regime viveu probleminhas”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/03/nao-houve-ditadura-teve-uns-probleminhas-diz-bolsonaro-sobre-regime-militar-no-pais.shtml.
Harvard International Review. 2019. “‘Tropical Trump’? Bolsonaro’s Threat to Brazilian Democracy”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://hir.harvard.edu/tropical-trump-bolsonaros-threat-to-brazilian-democracy/.
Latinobarómetro. 2018. “Informe 2018”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp.
Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel. 2018. How democracies die. First edition. New York: Crown.
Przeworski, Adam. 2019. Crises of democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Economist. 2021. “Can Brazil survive Bolsonaro?”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.economist.com/films/2021/06/04/can-brazil-survive-bolsonaro.
Veja. “Um dia, dois escândalos no governo Bolsonaro”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/matheus-leitao/um-dia-dois-escandalos-no-governo-bolsonaro/.
Vox. 2017. “Brazilians are losing faith in democracy and considering a return to military rule”. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/9/19/16333360/brazilians-losing-faith-democracy.
Wike, Richard; Silver, Laura; Castillo, Alexandra. Pew Research Center. 06/13/2021. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/.
* Beatriz Silva da Costa holds a bachelor’s degree and a Master’s in Political Science from the Federal University of Minas Gerais. She is an International Relations and Affairs Ph.D. candidate at the University of Virginia. Beatriz is a member of the Center for Legislative Studies and Executives, presidents, and cabinet politics Research group, both from the Federal University of Minas Gerais. Her research interests include presidentialism, corruption, and democracy. E-mail: bea.s.costa@gmail.com and/or bs5vh@virginia.edu.
Monetary Policy Response to COVID 19 – Brazil
by Kanishka Bhukya*
Edited and reviewed by Giovanna Imbernon
Just when the world economy was sailing smoothly after the double economic shocks of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Euro crisis of 2012, the COVID-19 Pandemic has once again managed to disrupt world economies. This unexpected jolt to the economies has compelled all central banks to introduce immediate monetary policies to save their grappling economies from crashing. Although the magnitude of the disruption varies from region to region, this article seeks to address the pandemic’s impact on Brazil’s economy and the subsequent monetary policies taken up to upturn the supply of money in the Brazilian economy.
What is Monetary Policy?
Monetary policy refers to the macroeconomic policies undertaken by a country’s central bank to manage economic growth and money supply,[1] and are carried out to realize objectives such as inflation, liquidity, growth, and consumption in an economy.[2] Open market operations, altering the amount of money that banks are required to maintain as reserves, modifying the interest rates, moral persuasion, etc., are a few of the instruments used to pump and constrict the flow of money into an economy.
Brazil’s Economy before the Pandemic
Brazil has had a very volatile economic history. It is characterized by recurrent cycles of booms and busts. However, since the introduction of Plano Real (“Real Plan”) in 1994, Brazil has had a fairly stable macroeconomic environment.[3] The economy came to a screeching halt in 2014 when a severe economic crisis hit the country due to the 2014 commodity price shock and internal economic measures’ failure.[4] Just when the Brazilian economy was recovering from the 2014 crisis, COVID-19 caused another blow to the economy.
The imposition of lockdown and other precautionary measures led to a staggering dip in economic activity and consumer demand. GDP grew at a sluggish rate of 0.5% in the fourth quarter of FY2020.[5] The unemployment rate was exceptionally high at 14.7%, and the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) growth declined to an astounding -3.8% in March 2020.[6]
Brazil’s Monetary Policy Response towards COVID-19
To prevent an economic fallout and increase the supply of money in the market, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) deployed a sturdy monetary policy to fight the current crisis. One of the salient instruments of the Brazilian monetary policy was its use of the Selic rate. Selic rate is the weighted average interest rate of overnight inter-bank operations, collateralized by federal government securities.[7] The Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) decides the Selic rate, which the BCB is obligated to maintain by performing daily open market operations.[8]
As a result, the Selic rate was reduced to a historical low of 2% on 9 August 2020 to fight the crisis.[9] This lower interest rate made it cheaper to borrow money. Now, the ones who were previously not willing to borrow money due to high interest rates will begin to borrow because of the cheaper borrowing costs. This results in an increase in the supply of money in the market. The excess money leads to an increase in spending and investment as it reduces the incentive to save. This, in turn, leads to an increase in aggregate demand. The rightward shift of aggregate demand increases the price level as well as the output produced in the country. Thus, closing the recessionary gap and producing output at its fullest potential. The graphs in Annexure 1 and Annexure 2 explain how monetary injection helps boost the Brazilian economy’s growth rate.
A Critical Analysis of Brazil’s Monetary Policy Response
A year after Covid-19 took the country by storm, looking at the state of the Brazilian economy shows that the monetary policy, along with the government’s fiscal measures, helped the economy run positively. Its economy grew by 3.2% in the fourth quarter, and household consumption shot up by 3.4%, along with a 20% surge in fixed business investment.[10] Although the overall GDP dropped by 4.1% in FY2021, it is way below the projections made by various economic think tanks such as the World Bank (8%) and International Monetary Fund (9.1%).[11] However, this economic growth could only last for a short while due to the rising fear over the new wave of coronavirus, rising inflation, and dwindling exchange rates.
As worries over the second strain of coronavirus persist, there have also been concerns over their old foe – inflation. The increase in monetary supply led to an inflation rate of 5.2%, which is way above the BCB’s mid-point target of 3.75% for FY2021.[12] The Producer Price Index also accelerated sharply by 23% in January 2021.[13] This made the BCB increase the Selic rate to 2.75%, and financial analysts predict another increase.[14] This would also help the country revive its dampening exchange rates, which fell 22.9% below the dollar in February compared to last year. Generally, lower interest rates make foreign investments unattractive. Thus, decreasing the demand for Brazilian Real and causing a reduction in its currency’s value.
Conclusion
The coronavirus pandemic has posed a unique problem to the Brazilian economy. It is stuck in a balancing act between a weak economy and rising inflation. While the more than expected hike in the Selic rate does keep inflation in check, it could have significant implications on economic growth. I believe that the government should look for a milder approach to check inflation considering the economy’s downturn due to the second wave of coronavirus. An increase of 50 basis points would have been more desirable than an increase of 75 basis points to balance economic growth and inflation suitably. However, Brazil has been far more successful than many of its contemporaries in handling the coronavirus pandemic. Its robust monetary policy managed to bring back the economy on track and encourage consumer spending and investment.
[1] Thomas Brock, ‘Monetary Policy’ (Investopedia, 18 December 2020) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monetarypolicy.asp> accessed 4 April 2021
[2] Ibid.
[3] Herwin Loman, ‘Brazil’s macro economy, past and present’ (Rabobank, 9 January 2014) <https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2014/january/brazils-macro-economy-past-and-present/> accessed 4 April 2021
[4] Steven M Helfand, ‘How did Brazil go from rising BRIC to sinking ship?’ (The Conversation, 15 June 2016) <https://theconversation.com/how-did-brazil-go-from-rising-bric-to-sinking-ship-57029> accessed 4 April 2021
[5] Jamie McGeever, ‘Brazil 2020 economic outlook darkens after lowest GDP growth in three years’ (Reuters, 4 March 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-economy-idUSKBN20R1TE> accessed 4 April 2021
[6] Infographic, ‘COVID-19 Impact on the Brazilian Economy’ (Datamatics Business Solutions, 21 June 2020) <https://mk0datamaticsbptoiun.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/infographics-covid-19-impact-on-brazil-economy.pdf> accessed 5 April 2021
[7] Banco central do brasil, ‘Selic interest rate’ (Banco Central Do Brasil) <https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/monetarypolicy/selicrate> accessed 6 April 2021
[8] Ibid.
[9] Mario Sergio Lima, ‘Brazil cuts its benchmark interest rate to an all-time low’ (Aljazeera, 6 August 2020) <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/8/6/brazil-cuts-its-benchmark-interest-rate-to-an-all-time-low> accessed 6 April 2021
[10] Aljazeera, ‘Brazil’s GDP drops 41 percent in 2020, beating gloomier outlooks’ (Aljazeera, 4 March 2021) <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/3/4/brazils-gdp-shrank-4-1-percent-in-2020-worst-drop-in-decades#:~:text=Latin%20America’s%20largest%20economy%20grew,a%20Reuters%20poll%20of%20economists.> accessed 6 April 2021
[11] Ibid.
[12] Akrur Barua, ‘Monetary policy turns its gaze on inflation’ (Deloitte Insights, 2 April 2021) <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/americas/brazil-economic-outlook.html> accessed 6 April 2021
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
*Kanishka Bhukya is a 2nd-year law student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. His main topics of interest include International Economic Law and Sovereign Debt Restructuring.
Special edition – Brazil’s Democratic “Backsliding”: why should we fear Bolsonaro’s government in Brazil?
As a research center, BRaS promotes and supports meaningful networks. We are continuously working to be a welcoming, dynamic, and insightful environment for collaboration. Therefore, I am delighted to share some exciting news: BRaS-Blog Special Editions (SE). Each Special Edition will have a coordinator responsible for choosing a trending topic related to Brazilian studies and inviting three researchers to write their perspectives on it.
Our launch could not be better: Flavia Batista da Silva organized a fantastic and thought-provoking SE about democratic backsliding in Brazil. In the following weeks, be ready to go deeper into the subject’s institutional, economic, and social aspects.
I am so proud of this SE, and I dearly thank Flávia for warmly accepting our invitation, as well as her creative and critical work. Finally, and as usual, I thank Giovanna and Claudia, whose remarkable work and support made this SE possible.
The Special Edition N. 1 is on! Enjoy!
Anna Paula Bennech
by Flavia Batista da Silva*
Edited and reviewed by Anna Paula Bennech and Giovanna Imbernon
Organized by Flavia Batista da Silva
Can Brazil survive Bolsonaro? That was a question recently raised by the British newspaper “The Economist,” and that has been intriguing politicians, economists, and political scientists all over the world, given the serious risks Bolsonaro’s government has been posing to Brazil’s 33-old-democracy over the last three years (The Economist, 2021). In fact, since 2019, when Bolsonaro, a far-right and former army captain, took office as the 38th president of Brazil, many already feared for the yet young, unstable Brazilian democracy. His militarized inner of ministers, undemocratic rhetoric, and active participation in anti-democratic rallies reinforced the concerns over the consequences of his government in Brazil. This special edition explores this debate by showing how Bolsonaro is currently threatening the democratic system in Brazil and why voting him out is necessary to prevent an institutional breakdown. Considering the state-of-the-art theories on democratic crisis and decline, we argue that Brazil is currently experiencing the signs of “democratic backsliding,” a debilitation of the political institutions that sustain democracy (Bermeo, 2016). In this first article, I discuss this theoretical approach using Brazil as an empirical case.
Before describing the signs of democratic backsliding in Brazil, a clear definition of democracy is needed. Democracy is here defined following the pluralist approach established by Robert A. Dahl (1971), who sustains democracy as a political system characterized by political competition and inclusiveness, where citizens must be able to formulate, signify, and have their preferences considered equally. The more competitive and inclusive a system is, the more it comes close to the democratic ideal defined by Dahl as “polyarchy.” In the past, democracy was believed to die suddenly by being shattered. Open-ended coups initiated by the military, classic executive coups, and election-day vote fraud were the most common manifests of backsliding. Since the Cold War, nevertheless, these trends have changed dramatically; democracies are more likely now to gradually erode through vexing backsliding forms. For instance, Bermeo argues that the classic backsliding varieties were replaced by promissory coups, executive aggrandizement, and strategically manipulated elections, all new forms of backsliding that now are legitimized by the democratic institutions themselves. In other words, although the occurrence of classic military and executive coups have declined substantially, the new backsliding forms continue to pose serious risks to democracies’ consolidation– perhaps even more than the past ones, given its incremental nature.
Brazil exemplifies the dangers of these new backsliding forms, especially regarding the occurrence of executive aggrandizement and strategically manipulated elections. According to Bermeo (2016), the first happens when “elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences” (p. 10). In other words, it occurs when democratically elected presidents use their mandate to weaken institutions. Since taking office in January 2019, Bolsonaro has attempted to undermine Brazil’s democratic institutions. Within the executive branch, Bolsonaro has altered decrees and rules, reduced the bureaucracy’s capacity, and interfered in key state departments to fulfill the interests of his allies and protect his family. To comply with his rural’s agenda and support agribusiness, for instance, Bolsonaro has weakened the National Indigenous Foundation (FUNAI, in Portuguese) and the Brazilian Environmental Institutes (including Brazil’s Environmental Agency (IBAMA) and the National Parks Service (ICMBio). Using his executive power, Bolsonaro has also interfered and extended his control over Public Universities by not appointing the most voted provosts, thus eroding the autonomy of these institutions (Maués, 2020). Bolsonaro also ended the anti-corruption operation Lava Jato (Car Wash Operation), claiming there is no corruption within his government, yet the indictments haunting his own family show otherwise (Oliveira et al., 2020). More recently, Bolsonaro blamed the lack of funds for postponing the country’s national census, thus hindering data production about his government – perhaps as a strategy for disguising his management of the pandemic in Brazil (Ribeiro, 2021).
Bolsonaro is also laying the groundwork to discredit Brazil’s electoral process, thus working to strategically manipulate the next 2022 elections. Bermeo (2016) defines this third form of backsliding as “a range of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents” (p. 12). That would include “hampering media access, using government funds for incumbent campaigns, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering voter registration, packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favor incumbents, and harassing opponents” (p. 13). In Brazil, Bolsonaro appears to be using his power to campaign for himself and question the electoral system. Over the last month, Bolsonaro has participated in several campaign rallies using public money. The last “motorcade” led by him in São Paulo is believed to have cost R$ 1,2 million to the government coffers (Phillips, 2021; Megale, 2021).
Additionally, since the 2018 electoral campaign, Bolsonaro has cast doubts on the Brazilian electoral system’s infallibility. More specifically, he questioned whether the Brazilian electronic Ballot Boxes could produce a fair outcome – that only being his victory (Romero, 2018). As a president, he became a tireless advocate of the paper ballot, claiming that electronic boxes are compromised due to their impossibility of being audited (Muggah, 2021). He questioned the last 2020 Brazilian Municipal Elections results after most of his preferred candidates got knocked out. After the invasion of the U.S. Capitol, he affirmed that Brazil could have worse problems than the U.S. if the vote remains electronic, yet no proof supporting his view was presented (Muggah, 2021). Bolsonaro then seems to question the electoral system only when he gets threatened or defeated by it.
The 33-old-Brazilian democracy is under severe threat. Bolsonaro is particularly helping to backslide the yet unconsolidated system by using his power to weaken important democratic institutions and discredit the electoral system. The effects of his anti-democracy playbook are especially apparent now amidst the COVID-19 pandemic’s mismanagement in Brazil. Institutional and economic crises, social inequality aggravation, and corruption scandals are some of the consequences of Bolsonaro’s aggrandizement and manipulation. The international concerns over the future of democracy in Brazil are thus not overestimated; they are rather essential to acknowledge the risks of not voting Bolsonaro out next year. Bolsonaro’s defeat seems to be the only way to prevent Brazilian democracy from backsliding and breaking down.
In the following articles of this special edition, we will discuss the Brazilian democratic crisis under institutional, economic, and social optics.
References
Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5-19.
Dahl, Robert 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1-32.
Maués, Antonio Moreira. 2020. Bolsonaro’s First Year: Trying to Erode Democracy. Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law. 06/21/2021. Available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/02/bolsonaros-first-year-trying-to-erode-democracy/.
Megale, Bela. 2021. “Motociata de Bolsonaro custou R$ 1,2 milhão aos cofres públicos de SP”. O Globo. 06/21/2021. Available at: https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/10/13/i-ended-lava-jato-a-reminder-of-the-bolsonaro-family-s-corruption-indictments.
Muggah, Robert. 2021. “Bolsonaro is following Trump’s Anti-Democracy Playbook”. Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/14/bolsonaro-brazil-trump-anti-democracy-elections/.
Oliveira, Caroline; Melito, Leandro and Sudré, Lu. 2020. “I ended Lava Jato: a reminder of the Bolsonaro’s family’s corruption indictments”. Brasil de Fato. 06/21/2021. Available at: https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/10/13/i-ended-lava-jato-a-reminder-of-the-bolsonaro-family-s-corruption-indictments.
Phillips, Tom. 2021. “Thousands rally at “obscene” motorcade for Jair Bolsonaro”. The Guardian. 06/21/2021. Available at: https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/10/13/i-ended-lava-jato-a-reminder-of-the-bolsonaro-family-s-corruption-indictments.
Ribeiro, Gustavo. 2021. “Brazil will postpone its census for yet another year”. The Brazilian Report. 06/21/2021. Available at: https://brazilian.report/number-of-the-week/2021/04/24/nationwide-census-postponement/.
Romero, Luiz. 2018. “Brazil’s radical presidential frontrunner is questioning its voting machines – especially if he loses”. Quartz. 06/21/2021. Available at: https://qz.com/1416512/bolsonaro-questions-brazils-voting-machines-especially-if-he-loses/.
The Economist. 2021. “Can Brazil survive Bolsonaro?”. 06/21/2021. Available at: https://www.economist.com/films/2021/06/04/can-brazil-survive-bolsonaro.
* Flavia Batista da Silva holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Brasilia, Brazil, and an M.A. in Brazilian Studies from the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. She is currently a first-year Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland studying Political Science. Flavia’s main interests include Comparative Politics, Brazilian Politics, elections, electoral campaigns, fake news, and democracy. E-mail: fbatista@umd.edu.
Flavia Batista da Silva (2021) "Special edition – Brazil’s Democratic “Backsliding”: why should we fear Bolsonaro’s government in Brazil?". Brazilian Research and Studies Blog. ISSN 2701-4924. Vol. 2 Num. 3. available at: https://bras-center.com/special-edition-brazils-democratic-backsliding-why-should-we-fear-bolsonaros-government-in-brazil/, accessed on: August 18, 2026.
BRaS Blog ISSN 2701-4924
