by PublicABCP
Translated and reviewed by Matheus Lucas Hebling
The article The Violence of Law-and-Order Politics: The Case of Law Enforcement Candidates in Brazil, published in the American Political Science Review, examines the local-level consequences of electing politicians who run on tough-on-crime, “law and order” platforms—particularly those with police or military backgrounds. Drawing on municipal election data, homicide statistics, and socioeconomic indicators, the study investigates how the politicization of public security affects different communities across Brazil.
Conducted by Lucas Martins Novaes, associate professor at Insper and PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, the research raises critical questions about how these politicians may influence the allocation of security resources—often to the detriment of equity and justice. The study was awarded the Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr. Award for Best Paper at the 14th Meeting of the Brazilian Political Science Association (ABCP).
To identify “law-and-order” candidates, Novaes examined ballot names that referenced police or military backgrounds—a common campaign tactic in Brazil. This enabled a targeted analysis of the impact of these officials on public safety outcomes, focusing specifically on municipalities where organized crime is not the main driver of violence. This approach allowed the study to isolate the political dynamics shaping law enforcement policy.
The findings are alarming: the election of law enforcement candidates is associated with a significant increase in homicides, particularly among non-white men, who are disproportionately vulnerable to violence. The study shows that once in power, these politicians tend to redirect security resources toward their electoral base—typically wealthier, safer neighborhoods—leaving poorer, high-risk communities underserved.
This politically motivated mismanagement of public security deepens social inequalities and exposes marginalized groups to greater harm. However, the study also identifies a key mitigating factor: municipal public security councils. In cities with active Conselhos Municipais de Segurança Pública, where citizens participate in the oversight of police policy and resource distribution, the harmful effects of electing law-and-order candidates are significantly reduced. These councils promote transparency, curb political favoritism, and ensure a more equitable allocation of security resources.
Novaes concludes that, without effective oversight mechanisms, the election of candidates with law enforcement backgrounds can lead to biased and unequal security governance. His findings underscore the urgent need for institutional reforms that ensure democratic accountability in policing, reduce violence, and promote fairness in public security policy.
About the Author
Lucas Martins Novaes holds a degree in Economics from the University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), a master’s in Economics from FGV São Paulo, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He is an associate professor at Insper, a former research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, and a non-resident research associate at the Center on the Politics of Development. His research focuses on political representation in developing countries, including topics such as party organization, retrospective voting, quotas, clientelism, public security, and the influence of the media.
Article Details
Title: The Violence of Law-and-Order Politics: The Case of Law Enforcement Candidates in Brazil
Author: Lucas Martins Novaes
Publication Year: 2023
Where to Read: American Political Science Review, Volume 118, Issue 1
