by Thomas Kestler (University of Würzburg)
Brazilian democracy has experienced turbulent years. Beginning with the mass protests of 2013, the country entered a period of intense political polarization accompanied by escalating political conflict. The controversial impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the election of the far-right outsider Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, and the attempted coup of 2023 were all manifestations of a broader political crisis (Avritzer & Rennó, 2025).
As a result, the quality of Brazilian democracy deteriorated significantly. Brazil’s Freedom House score declined from 81 (out of 100) in 2014 to 72 in 2024. Similarly, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) recorded a decline in Brazil’s democracy score from 8.15 (on a scale from 1 to 10) in 2014 to 6.9 in 2024. The most pronounced decline occurred between 2018 and 2023, when Bolsonaro’s erratic and confrontational governing style coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. This decline was driven by high levels of political violence, an increasingly hostile relationship between the government and the media, and the revelations surrounding the Lava Jato corruption scandal, which surpassed even Brazil’s already high standards of political corruption (Fishlow, 2020).
Democratic erosion and recovery
Since the change of government in 2023, however, democratic development has once again moved in a positive direction. Although current scores remain below previous peaks, the overall trend is clearly upward (Macias-Weller & Kestler, 2026). In the most recent BTI report, Brazil achieves a democracy score of 7.5, while V-Dem indicators for liberal democracy have also improved considerably recently.
Against this background, Brazil is described as a case of democratic resilience (Couto et al., 2025; Spektor, 2025). Fears of far-reaching democratic erosion associated with Bolsonaro’s election ultimately did not materialize. Indeed, Congress strengthened its position during Bolsonaro’s presidency, while the judiciary successfully resisted executive encroachments. Brazil nevertheless remains vulnerable to democratic backsliding, given the persistence of high levels of polarization and the continuing popularity of Bolsonarismo, now represented by the former president’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro.
This raises important questions: What areas of the democratic system were most affected by erosion during Bolsonaro’s government? Why did Bolsonaro’s undeniably authoritarian ambitions fail? And how resilient is Brazilian democracy in the face of future challenges?
Melo and Pereira (2024) point to the consensus-oriented character of Brazil’s political system and, above all, to its strong vertical and horizontal checks and balances: “Bolsonaro’s illiberal initiatives, which were many, have met with vigorous institutional responses” (p. 141). Civil society organizations and independent media outlets also proved remarkably resilient and willing to stand up against the government. Faced with substantial resistance, Bolsonaro was ultimately forced to operate within the established rules of the political system and abandon much of his authoritarian agenda. For this reason, Melo and Pereira characterize Brazil as “a case of quick recovery” and place it within the broader category of democratic “near misses” described by Ginsburg and Huq (2018).
While this interpretation is persuasive, it also leaves important questions unanswered. First, it remains unclear whether Brazil’s relatively favorable democratic development can truly be attributed to the resilience of its political institutions or whether it was partly the result of Bolsonaro’s own shortcomings. His impulsive leadership style and limited political skills prevented him from building durable alliances and led him to alienate powerful actors who might otherwise have supported him. Second, Bianchi et al. (2025) argue that democracies may remain vulnerable even after recovering from episodes of democratic erosion because institutions are weakened and susceptible to future attacks. The Brazilian far right may learn from Bolsonaro’s mistakes and adopt more sophisticated strategies for undermining democratic institutions.
The Resilience of Democratic Institutions
To assess the resilience of Brazilian democracy in the face of future challenges, it is necessary to examine developments during the Bolsonaro years more closely. In particular, it is important to identify which democratic subdimensions proved vulnerable and which demonstrated resilience. The BTI offers a useful framework for this purpose, as it combines numerical scores with detailed country reports that allow developments to be traced in greater depth.
A closer look at the individual indicators reveals that the decline in democratic quality under Bolsonaro affected almost all dimensions of democracy. However, between 2018 and 2024 most indicators declined only marginally, usually by a single point. Only two indicators registered a more substantial decline of two points: freedom of expression and civil rights
According to the BTI country report 2024, independent media and government critics faced sustained attacks, including public harassment, legal proceedings, online intimidation, and restrictions on freedom of expression. The government further undermined media independence by transforming the state communications agency into a vehicle for political propaganda and by spreading disinformation on issues such as elections and COVID-19. Hostile rhetoric directed at journalists continued even after Bolsonaro left office. In the area of civil rights, government rhetoric contributed to increasing discrimination and violence against women and minority groups. Other negative developments included the growing influence of radical religious groups, the use of force against demonstrators, efforts to obstruct corruption investigations, and repeated—though ultimately unsuccessful—attacks on democratic institutions.
One of the most persistent weaknesses of Brazilian democracy remains its party system, which is characterized by extreme fragmentation, personalistic leadership, and weak social roots. During Bolsonaro’s presidency, this indicator deteriorated further as political polarization intensified. Yet this weakness did not enable Bolsonaro to dominate Congress. On the contrary, he encountered considerable resistance and was forced to make substantial concessions in order to advance his legislative agenda. As Melo and Pereira (2024, p. 140) observe, Brazilian “parties are very weak in the electoral arena, but strong inside Congress.”
At the same time, the electoral process, the separation of powers, and judicial independence remained largely stable and consistently received high scores between 2014 and 2026. In particular, the electoral system and institutions such as the electoral courts successfully resisted attempts to delegitimize the October 2022 presidential election. Another area of strength was the network of associations and interest groups, which continued to provide effective channels of communication between society and the political system. This indicator remained stable throughout Bolsonaro’s presidency. Public support for democracy even increased. By 2022, support for authoritarian rule had fallen to its lowest level since measurements began in 1989.
Overall, the decline in democratic quality between 2018 and 2024 can largely be attributed to the conduct of the Bolsonaro government itself. This included not only repeated rhetorical transgressions but also occasional acts of physical intimidation and violence, particularly in the context of political demonstrations. The culmination of Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic project was undoubtedly the storming of government buildings in January 2023, intended to prevent the elected president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, from assuming office. Yet the democratic core of the system—its institutions and procedures—remained largely intact. With the exception of increasing polarization among voters, most structural features of Brazilian democracy remained stable.
Turning to more recent developments reflected in the BTI 2026 report, most indicators have recovered to approximately their 2018 levels. Under Lula da Silva’s more moderate style of governance and greater respect for democratic norms, the indicators that suffered most during Bolsonaro’s presidency, particularly freedom of expression and civil rights, have improved significantly.
In conclusion, the assessment offered by Melo and Pereira (2024) appears broadly correct. Brazil’s consensus democracy, with its numerous veto points and extensive system of checks and balances, weathered the challenge posed by Bolsonarismo remarkably well. Most importantly, the core institutional pillars of democracy—the electoral system, horizontal accountability, and judicial independence—remained consistently strong throughout the period, suggesting a high degree of democratic resilience. Whether these institutions would prove equally resilient against a future autocratic challenger who is more politically skilled and strategically sophisticated than Bolsonaro, however, remains an open question.
Source: https://bti-project.org/
References
Avritzer, Leonardo, and Lucio Rennó. 2025. The Crisis of Democracy in Brazil. Springer
Bianchi, Matías, Nic Cheeseman, and Jennifer Cyr. 2025. “The Myth of Democratic Resilience.” Journal of Democracy 36 (3):33–46. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2025.a964563.
Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves, Rogério Bastos Arantes, and Fernando Luiz Abrucio. 2025. “Institutional Transformation and Resilience in Brazilian Democracy (2012-2025): Polity, Politics, and Policy in Interaction.” Revista de Sociologia e Política 33 https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-98732433e010-en.
Fishlow, Albert. 2020. “Lava Jato in Perspective.” In Corruption and the Lava Jato Scandal in Latin America, Edited by Lagunes, Paul, and Jan Svejnar. Routledge.
Ginsburg, Tom, and Aziz Huq. 2018. “Democracy’s near Misses.” Journal of Democracy 29 (4):16–30. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0059.
Macias-Weller, Ariam, and Thomas Kestler. 2026. “Enduring Weaknesses and Emerging Challenges. BTI-Regional Report Latin America.” Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/regional-dashboard/LAC?&cb=00000.https://doi.org/10.11586/2026051.
Melo, Marcus André, and Carlos Pereira. 2024. “Why Didn’t Brazilian Democracy Die?” Latin American Politics and Society 66 (4):133–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2024.4.
Spektor, Matias. 2025. “The Coalition against Democratic Backsliding in Bolsonaro’s Brazil.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712 (1):169–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162241309487.
